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INTRODUCTION
Since its introduction two decades ago (Cohen and Felson 1979), routine
activities theory has emerged as a leading approach for explaining crime.
During its brief history, the theory has weathered debates over its conceptualization
as a micro- or macro-level theory (Capowich 1999), criticisms of its assumptions
(Jeffery 1993), and disquieting research findings (Massey, Krohn, and
Bonati 1989). Still, the volume of research that acknowledges an intellectual
debt to the routine activities approach continues to expand. This is due,
in part, to recent attempts to marry routine activities with other theories
of crime such as rational choice (Clarke and Felson 1993), situational
crime prevention (Clarke 1997), and social disorganization (Bursik and
Grasmick 1993; Miethe and Meier 1994). Routine activities theory has also
figured prominently in the field's movement away from its offender-centered
focus (Sutherland model) toward the study of criminal events (see Sacco
and Kennedy 1996). As routine activities theory leaves its adolescence,
it is a good time to reflect on past developments and future prospects
for the maturing theory.
This paper charts the evolution of the theory in two parts. The first
section seeks to uncover the key elements in an updated routine activity
theory, while the second part is given to the application of the theory
to a new area of research. Formally stated, this investigation seeks:
1) to outline the primary tenets and current reformulations of routine
activities theory, 2) to highlight linkages with other theoretical approaches
to crime and critically assess how such mergers inform routine activities
theory, 3) to explore the most current application of routine activities
theory (the use of civil remedies to discourage crime), and 4) to identify
shortcomings in routine activities theory and research.
The arguments presented are structured around a detailed review of the
literature. The paper also attempts to uncover the relationship between
a reworked routine activities theory and the expanded use of civil remedies
to discourage crime. As such, this project seeks to join other theory-building
efforts in this budding area of crime research (see Mazerolle and Roehl
1998; Buerger and Mazerolle 1998).
THE RUDIMENTS OF ROUTINE ACTIVITIES
The discussion begins with a description of routine activities theory
as originally conceived. This is accomplished by revisiting Cohen and
Felson's explication of the theory (1979). The fundamental precepts presented
here form the foundation for subsequent discussions of theory integration
and model reformulation.
Theory of Crime
In the 1970s, most criminological research focused on the motivations
and characteristics of offenders. In contrast, Cohen and Felson investigated
the characteristics of the criminal event rather than the characteristics
of the offender. They offered the following explanation for their alternative
approach: "Unlike many criminological inquires, we do not examine
why individuals or groups are inclined criminally, but rather we take
criminal inclination as given and examine the manner in which the spatio-temporal
organization of social activities helps people to translate their criminal
inclinations into action" (1979:589). In short, theirs is a theory
of crime, not criminality.1
Key Concepts
According to Cohen and Felson (1979), for a direct contact predatory crime
to occur (e.g., robbery), three elements must converge at a particular
time and place: 1) motivated offender with both criminal inclinations
and the ability to carry out those inclinations, 2) suitable target, and
3) absence of capable guardians against a violation. If one of these components
is missing, then a crime will not likely occur. Routine patterns of behavior
(activities) affect the convergence of these three elements. Routine activities
are defined as "recurrent and prevalent activities which provide
for basic population and individual needs, whatever their biological or
cultural origins" (1979:593). They include activities that occur
in the home, at work, and at other places outside the home (e.g., grocery
store, movie theater). The frequency of their convergence is also dictated
by certain ecological factors such as the periodicity with which events
occur (rhythm) and the timing of an offender's rhythms with those of the
victim (1979:590).
The basic premise underlying routine activity theory is that structural
changes in society increase criminal opportunities (Miethe and Meier 1994:36).
Cohen and Felson argue that the dramatic increase in crime since World
War II is attributable to a shift from routine activities at home to activities
outside the home. These changes in the routine activity structure of American
society have led "to a corresponding increase in target suitability
and decrease in guardian presence" (1979:598). For example, the movement
of people from tightly-knit city neighborhoods to suburban bedroom communities,
the ease of leisure travel, and the increasing participation of women
in the work force have all led to fewer guardians in the home and more
targets outside it. At the core of the theory is an assumption that household
and family activities entail lower risk of criminal victimization than
those activities that take place outside the home. They contend that "nonfamily
members are usually much more dangerous than family members are to each
other" (1979:594).
The key tenets of routine activity theory are concisely summarized in
three propositions offered by Miethe and Meier (1994:39). First, greater
levels of non-household activity should increase victimization risks by
increasing one's visibility and accessibility as a crime target. Second,
higher levels of self-protection or guardianship should decrease individuals'
risks and aggregate rates of predatory crime. Third, persons and property
with higher subjective or material value to offenders should have higher
risks of victimization than less attractive crime targets.
THEORETICAL LINKAGES
Early on in its history, criminologists discovered the complementary nature
of the routine activities approach and incorporated its tenets into other
crime and criminality theories. It has become a stock ingredient in many
popular theoretical integrations (Bursik and Grasmick 1993; Miethe and
Meier 1994; Clarke 1997). In this section, key linkages between routine
activity theory and rational choice, situational crime prevention, traditional
social control, self-control, and social disorganization perspectives
are uncovered. The goal is to gain a better understanding of the historical
development and refinement of routine activities theory. For the most
part, the extant linkages appear to be on solid theoretical ground. One
dean of criminology sees merit in combining theories which share basic
assumptions including rational choice, social control, routine activities,
socialization, and social learning (Hirschi 1986:117).
Rational Choice
More than any other theory included in this section, rational choice is
most akin to routine activities. Although still a minority theory among
criminologists, its use seems to be growing.2
The theories are similar in their focus on characteristics
of the crime rather than characteristics of the offender. They are also
alike in other respects. However, before discussing other similarities,
it is important to first describe the theory itself. The starting point
for rational choice theory is the assumption that "offenders seek
to benefit themselves by their criminal behavior; that this involves the
making of decisions and of choices, however rudimentary on occasion these
processes might be; and that these processes exhibit a measure of rationality,
albeit by limits of time and ability and availability of relevant information"
(Cornish and Clarke 1986:1).
From this statement, it is possible to distill out the primary features
of rational choice theory. First, the individual offender is the only
unit of analysis, alternatively referred to as the individualistic postulate
or methodological individualism (see Buchanan and Tullock 1962). Second,
offenders are self-interested. That is, they only seek to benefit themselves
through their actions. Third, the individual is portrayed as a rational
actor. The offender, prior to making a decision to commit a crime, will
weigh the risks and benefits for each decision alternative. This conception
of the "reasoning offender" is rooted in Bentham's utilitarianism.
If perceived risks outweigh expected gains, the individual will not commit
the crime.
Besides sharing common assumptions, routine activity and rational choice
theories complement each other in significant ways. Whereas routine activity
theory is silent on how an offender makes decisions, rational choice offers
up a reasoning offender who seeks to maximize individual utility. Routine
activity theory also informs the rational choice perspective. For example,
routine activities theory adds target accessibility and the likelihood
of getting caught (guardianship) to the reasoning offender's decision
calculus.
Situational Crime Prevention
In a popular definition, situational crime prevention is described as
"opportunity-reducing measures that (1) are directed at highly specific
forms of crime, (2) involve the management, design or manipulation of
the immediate environment in as systematic and permanent way as possible,
(3) make crime more difficult or risky, or less rewarding and excusable
as judged by a wide range of offenders" (Clarke 1997, 4). As evidenced
in this definition, situational crime prevention is a synthesis of many
theories including routine activities (management and manipulation of
environment through surveillance and target hardening), rational choice
(making the crime more risky or less rewarding), and environmental criminology
(specific design improvements to public housing to limit access by outsiders).3
The empirical research on situational crime prevention is quite voluminous.4
The findings from two sources are offered to illustrate
the breadth of work done in this area. In his review of 122 evaluations
of crime prevention programs, Poyner (1993) found that certain preventive
techniques were quite effective against specific crimes. By way of example,
studies show that car crime is reduced when surveillance over parking
areas is increased and car security devices are used (e.g., electronic
access control, car steering-column locks). For other crimes, target removal/modification
or changes in environmental design (lighting, fencing) had the greatest
preventive effects. In the second edition of his book Situational Crime
Prevention: Successful Case Studies (1997), Clarke presents sixteen opportunity-reducing
techniques. Many of these efforts overlap key elements in routine activities
theory. For example, in one case (#14) researchers found that increasing
the number of convenience store clerks working at night (surveillance
by employees) reduced the number of robberies. In sum, a variety of situational
factors do appear to reduce criminal opportunity.
Traditional Control Theory
In the initial presentation of routine activity theory, Felson readily
admits to taking offenders "as a given" (Felson 1995: 54). However,
in a later reworking of the theory, Felson (1986) corrected the simplistic
portrayal of offenders by incorporating the effects of informal social
control into the model. This was accomplished by linking routine activity
to Hirschi's control theory (1969). Felson reorganized routine activity
theory to include a two step version of control theory. In the first stage,
society establishes social bonds, which attach a handle to each individual.
In the second stage, someone with sufficient knowledge of the potential
offender (e.g., parent, other members of the community) is able to grasp
the "handle" and exert control over the individual. Where the
guardian is responsible for supervising the likely target, the "intimate
handler" is responsible for supervising the likely offender. The
individual is susceptible to informal social control by virtue of his/her
bonds to society. "Informal social control requires both attaching
handles to youths and organizing community life so that such handles can
be grasped" (Felson 1995:54).
Self-Control
Self-control theory has been synthesized into routine activity theory.
Even though self-control is established early in life (see Gottfredson
and Hirschi 1990), Felson argues that many people need gentle, or in some
circumstances, forceful reminders to keep them from breaking societal
rules (Felson 1998). For most, informal social bonds keep desires in check.
Those who exhibit the lowest levels of self-control may be subjected to
formal mechanisms of social control (e.g., incarceration). In the end,
he sees the need for a system of "assisted self-control" to
ensure proper behaviors.
Social Disorganization
Recently, researchers have started to bridge the previously cavernous
divide between micro and macro understandings of crime and social context
(Sampson and Wooldredge 1987; Bursik and Grasmick 1993; Rountree, Land,
and Miethe 1994; Miethe and Meier 1994). Models that isolate micro (routine
activities, rational choice) from aggregate level variables (social disorganization)
are being overshadowed by sophisticated multi-level models that incorporate
both sets of factors. In a sense, this is a return to the ecological roots
of routine activities theory that placed offender, target, and guardian
in a social context. Due to advances in statistical analyses of multi-level
data, it is now possible to isolate the direct and interaction effects
of micro and macro factors. Using hierarchical logistic model techniques,
Rountree et al. (1994) found some positive direct effects (heterogeneity
on the risk of burglary victimization) as well as interaction effects
between neighborhood and individual opportunity factors for certain crimes.
REFORMULATED ROUTINE ACTIVITY MODEL
Informed by the original routine activities theory and subsequent theoretical
integrations, it is now possible to offer an updated routine activities
model for further study and application. The reworked model includes:
current conceptualizations of the three key elements of crime (motivated
offenders, suitable targets, and absence of guardians); intimate handlers;
places and place managers; responsibility levels for crime discouragement;
and crime facilitators. Each is discussed in turn below.
Motivated Offenders, Suitable Targets, and Absence of Guardians
Responding to twenty years of research, the original elements of routine
activities theory have been refined in significant ways. As noted earlier,
in the original theory, a good supply of "motivated" offenders
was simply assumed. The motivation of offenders was not a primary consideration
as evidenced by the following quotation: "The convergence in time
and space of suitable targets and the absence of capable guardians can
lead to large increases in crime rates without any increase or change
in the structural conditions that motivate individuals to engage in crime"
(Cohen and Felson 1979:604). In the theory's latest iteration, the "motivated"
offender has been replaced by a "likely" offender (Felson 1998:53).
On the surface, this change in nomenclature appears to be a cosmetic move
without any substantive value. However, the change reflects the adoption
of the rational choice conceptualization of the "reasoning"
offender. Now, offender decision making is cast in utilitarian terms -
"Offenders seek to gain quick pleasure and to avoid imminent pain"
(23). Further, the decision to commit a crime also depends on specific
setting, offense, and type of offender. These changes reflect the blending
between the two micro theories. The likely offender is still cast in decidedly
negative terms. Predatory offenders are characterized as "impersonal"
and lacking a care to "how the victim feels." In the end, "the
offender is most interested in helping himself" (54).5
Felson (1998:54-55) has recommended measuring the suitability of a target
from the offender's viewpoint. He has organized the offender's "suitability
considerations" into four areas. Simply stated, offenders consider
the value, inertia, and visibility of a target, as well as access to the
target. The concept of target suitability has evolved since its initial
description. It now includes elements of rational choice and situational
crime prevention. Houses that are located near a highway access ramp tend
to have more problems with crime. Controls limiting access (fenced yards)
or target visibility (off-street parking) may be instituted as crime prevention
techniques.
In line with the other two elements just described, the concept of guardianship
has been modified in light of new research findings. Most significantly,
the concept of guardianship (originally conceived as a single relationship
between protector and target) has been extended to three types of monitoring
relationships - guardian/target, handler/offender, and manager/place.
These items will be discussed in greater detail in the following sections.
Finally, it is also important to note that the explanatory power of routine
activities theory has been extended beyond predatory crimes to other types
of illicit activities such as juvenile delinquency, fights, and various
forms of vice (see Felson 2002 generally). This is significant since it
introduces a host of new dynamics not considered in the original formulation
(e.g., what is the target in a drug deal?).
Intimate Handler
The "intimate" handler, the person(s) wielding informal social
control over a handled offender, has been replaced by a "personal"
handler who monitors likely offenders (Felson 1995, 60). Some handlers
are intimate with the offender (parent-child) while other relationships
are hierarchical (principal sending kids back to school) or among strangers
(a stranger questioning boys at a mall). The monitoring relationship between
handler and offender is an extension of the original guardian concept.
It forms one of the three structural relationships that discourage crime.
Place Management
In the earliest statement of routine activities theory, places were narrowly
conceived as the physical location where offenders, guardians, and targets
converged. "Place" was not an active element in the facilitation
or reduction of crime. Eck (1994) adds the relationship between place
and place managers into the reformulated theory. For him, certain place
managers can serve to discourage crime by looking after a particular place
(e.g., doorman protects building, receptionist monitors entry to offices).
Responsibility Levels for Crime Discouragement
Building on the earlier work by Clarke, Felson (1995) constructed a typology
of guardian responsibility for crime discouragement. Controllers (handler,
guardian, and manager) may assume one of four levels of responsibility
(personal, assigned, diffuse job, and general). Personal responsibility
is an intimate form of responsibility that is assumed by owners of businesses,
family, and friends. Assigned responsibility is granted to employees who
are given specific crime discouragement tasks. For example, a jewelry
store worker is responsible for monitoring store displays to prevent pilferage.
Diffuse responsibility is assumed by workers who have general assignments
that may deter criminals (e.g., a hotel maid impairs a trespasser). Lastly,
general responsibility is taken by any bystander or visitor whose presence
alone discourages crime.
New research introduces another category to the level of responsibility
typology described above - non-offending third parties. Buerger and Mazerolle
(1998) describe the emergence of "third party policing" which
are efforts to persuade or coerce non-offending persons to take actions
that are outside their routine activities, and which are designed to indirectly
minimize disorder caused by other persons or to reduce the possibility
that crime may occur (301). In short, an overt threat of legal punishment
is used to force a non-offending third party to accept a guardianship
role that they would not have accepted if not for the threat of legal
sanction. The ultimate target of the police action is a group of actual
or potential offenders. The third party is viewed as an intermediary who
is thought to have some influence over the likely offenders. Place managers
(e.g., owners of bars and landlords) may be compelled to take on an active
guardianship role. This type of responsibility differs from the others
described above in that it is a coerced responsibility enforced by the
threat of legal sanction.
Crime Facilitators
Clarke (1997) recommends an additional element in his crime opportunity
structure - facilitators of crime. These are the physical resources that
assist the offender to commit a crime. Many examples exist including getaway
cars, weapons, stolen credit cards, and burglar's tools among others.6
Additionally, drugs and alcohol serve as crime facilitators
if they reduce inhibitions held by the likely offender prior to the criminal
act. Individuals not actively involved in the criminal act, but present
at the scene, may serve as a source of encouragement for the offender.
A crime may be committed to impress on-looking gang members, for example.
Figure 1 illustrates a modified routine activity theory model that reflects
the relationships that discourage crime. The original elements of routine
activity theory - offender, target, and absence of a guardian - are retained
in the updated approach. The now familiar "crime triangle" formed
by these three core components is evident in the new diagram.7
At its core, the theory is still about the convergence
of a likely offender, capable guardian, and suitable target within a particular
crime setting. The new model provided here simply adds the important guardian
relationships to the crime triangle.
The three vertical lines represent the guardian relationships between
"crime promoters" (offender, target, and place) and "crime
preventers" (handler, target guardian, and manager) (Eck 1999). These
relationships, indicated by darkened lines, form the superstructure in
a web of crime prevention. Crime is less likely to occur in a setting
where the three guardian relationships are present and strong.
Delinquent behavior is checked in a school environment characterized
by the visible monitoring activities of teachers, administrators, school
resource officers, and parents. When freed from adult supervision, the
frequency of youth crime escalates. The other strands of the web indicate
secondary factors in preventing crime. If the crime preventers work in
concert to secure a particular location, then a criminal event is less
likely to occur. The surveillance provided by a guardian may have a secondary
influence on other crime promoters. That is, guardians may play simultaneous
crime prevention roles. For example, a parent/chaperon may exercise personal
control over a child at a school dance while providing general surveillance
of the dance hall. In sum, when the ties are strong along multiple strands
of the web, then the likelihood of a criminal event occurring is reduced.
Of final note, the web of crime discouragement operates within a setting,
which may include other people or objects that facilitate the commission
of a crime.
CIVIL REMEDIES, ROUTINE ACTIVITIES, AND CRIME DISCOURAGEMENT
The goal of this section is to apply the reformulated routine activity
theory just described to an emerging area of criminological research -
the use of civil remedies to prevent crime. The three areas of civil law
considered in the instant analysis are nuisance abatement, youth curfews,
and alcohol server liability. Where appropriate, the academic literature
is supplemented with relevant statutory and common law citations. Since
this is a relatively new area of criminological inquiry, it is wise to
begin with a brief overview of civil remedies and their relationship to
crime prevention.
Civil remedies are procedures and sanctions specified by civil statutes
and regulations that are used to prevent or reduce criminal problems and
incivilities (Mazerolle and Roehl 1998:1). Civil remedies include restitution,
fines/penalties, loss of government benefits and privileges (e.g., business
and occupational licenses), forfeitures, injunctions/civil protection
orders, and detention (Cheh 1991). The use of civil remedies has grown
substantially since the mid-1980s. The earliest examples of civil remedy
approaches targeted non-offending third parties, typically landlords and
property owners, and used nuisance and drug abatement statutes to control
problems (see also Buerger and Mazerolle 1998). Through the use of fines
and property forfeitures, the statutes sought to compel landlords and
owners to maintain nuisance- and drug-free properties.8
Later applications targeted offenders directly. For
example, local governments in California aggressively use public nuisance
laws to prevent suspected gang members from congregating in targeted neighborhoods
and public spaces (Werdegar 1999). Batterers, gangs, and delinquent youths
are now commonly subjected to civil remedies that restrict their free
movement and assembly (Mazerolle and Roehl 1998:2-3).
Another civil law intervention involves landlords and tenants. With increasing
frequency, crime victims are taking civil action against landlords for
allowing criminogenic conditions to develop and remain unabated in rental
properties. In general, landlords owe "a duty to tenants…and
guests to use ordinary care to protect them against an unreasonable and
foreseeable risk of harm from the criminal acts of third parties"
(Ruskell 2000). Courts in California and Texas recently found property
owners negligent when they failed to provide adequate security in the
face of known threats (i.e., gang activity). In the Texas case, the landlord
was faulted due to the property manager's complete lack of knowledge about
criminal activity taking place at the apartment complex (see Ruskell 2000).
Interestingly, this phenomenon has created a secondary market for crime
analysis research. Some businesses now consult "crime vulnerability"
studies to learn of potential crime problems at various store locations
in order to mitigate exposure to civil liability suits (Stugrin 2001).
Why use civil rather than criminal remedies to discourage crime? First,
there is a general perception that criminal law processes (i.e., arrest,
prosecution, and incarceration) do not resolve the underlying causes behind
most disputes. Civil remedies have a reputation for getting at the true
criminogenic cause (e.g., coercing landlords to evict drug dealing tenants).
Second, civil remedies are relatively inexpensive and easy to implement.
A single person or a small group of neighbors can initiate a suit. Also,
the burden of proof requirements are easier to meet in civil actions in
comparison to criminal law violations (Mazerolle and Roehl 1998:3-4).
Nuisance Abatement
"Nuisance abatement is a civil process by which a government agency,
business, or private citizen sues the owner of a property that is the
source of a public nuisance…to compel the end of the nuisance"
(Eck and Wartell 1998:163-164). For example, under North Carolina law
a public nuisance is defined as an act that unreasonably interferes with
the health, safety, or property rights of the community (see generally
Chapter 19 of North Carolina General Statutes). Drug dealing and prostitution
constitute public nuisances under these laws. In general, three civil
remedies are available for abating the nuisance: damages (only in cases
where plaintiff has suffered some unique damage), injunctive relief (e.g.,
order directing a property owner to curb drug use at the site), or self-help
(public authority may abate the nuisance, i.e., take the property through
civil forfeiture, after due notice).
The elaborated routine activities model provides a useful framework for
understanding the link between nuisance abatement and crime prevention.
Eck's (1994) contribution to the theory, the management of place, is especially
important here. Routine activities theory was originally developed to
explain predatory crime. The addition of place managers to the web of
crime discouragement expands the range of crimes that may be explained
by the theory. Prior to Eck's work, consensual crimes such as the buying
and selling of drugs did not fit well into the original theory because
the targets and controllers were not clearly specified. That issue has
been overcome by recognizing the management of places as a necessary condition
for the commission of a crime.
Since nuisance abatement involves the use of real property, our focus
is on the place manager/amenable place relationship. Eck and Wartell (1998)
found poor place management to be causally related to certain crimes (e.g.,
drug dealing). In the case of a rental property that is being used for
the sale and distribution of drugs, the owner of the property has personal
responsibility for supervising the rental unit. Day-to-day place management
may be assigned to a building manager who seeks to ensure the proper functioning
of the dwelling. Even though the property owner or his/her employee is
not involved in the criminal behavior that may be taking place at the
rental property, they still retain their original place management responsibility.
There is a general recognition that property owners have the power and
responsibility to regulate the behaviors of those people who use their
property (Eck and Wartell 1998:163). As such, the property owner may be
compelled (through tortious claims) to end the nuisance. In essence, the
property owner is forced to become a more active place manager under the
threat of civil punishment. More active place management leads to crime
desistance and future crime prevention. In sum, the routine activities
approach provides a useful theoretical base for understanding the relationship
between civil remedies and crime prevention.
Juvenile Curfews
In the United States, the use of youth curfews is a widespread practice.
By 1995, almost 75 percent of the largest U.S. cities had a curfew (LeBoeuf
1996). Curfews seek to reduce the street presence of teenagers, especially
at night. The primary rationale offered for curfews is to protect children
and to deal with youth crime (White 1998, 125). The implementation of
curfews does vary somewhat across locales. Most rely solely on fines and
court orders while others require juvenile and parental attendance at
various social and community programming. Some cities have parental responsibility
provisions in their curfew ordinances. In these cities, parents may receive
hefty fines ($500 in Dallas, Texas) if their child repeatedly violates
the curfew. Another city fines store owners who harbor curfew violators
(LeBoeuf 1996).
We can again ply the tools of routine activities theory to understand
the relationship between civil remedies such as curfews and crime prevention.
First the types of supervisors and supervisory relationships that are
at work should be identified. For Mazerolle and Roehl (1998:9), the emphasis
is "more on problem youth, than problem places." In the language
of routine activities, the primary relationship in the web of crime discouragement
is the personal handler/likely offender dyad. Curfews, when viewed through
this lens, are meant to increase the amount of adult supervision and control
over juveniles by moving them into a household or other strictly regulated
setting. Here, parents have a personal responsibility for supervising
their children. Two other crime discouraging relationships also operate
through youth curfews. First, the police play an important role in monitoring
places for potential curfew violations and other delinquent acts. The
police have assigned responsibility by virtue of their employment and
formal duties in enforcing the ordinance. Second, as noted earlier, some
curfews are expressly created to protect children. Curfews may be viewed
as a way to enhance parental guardianship over the likely targets of street
or gang-related crime.
Server Liability
Many states have dram shop or civil liability acts which impose liability
on the seller of intoxicating liquors when a third party is injured as
a result of the intoxication of the buyer where the sale has caused or
contributed to such intoxication. Such acts protect the third party not
only against personal injuries and property damages resulting directly
from affirmative acts of the intoxicated man, such as resulting from negligent
operation of vehicle or assault and battery, but also against the loss
of family support due to such injuries (Black 1990:494).
In North Carolina, it is illegal for a permittee to knowingly sell or
give alcoholic beverages to someone who is intoxicated (N.C.G.S §
18B-305). The general purpose of this statute is to protect "the
customer from the adverse consequences of intoxication" and to protect
"the community from the possible injurious consequences of contact
with the intoxicated person" Hutchens v. Hankins 63 N.C. App.
1, 303 S.E.2d 593 (1983).9 In
short, the bartender/server may be civilly liable for damages caused by
the inebriate.
Server liability laws place bartenders into a handler/likely offender
relationship with patrons (these laws also establish bartenders as non-offending
third parties). They are responsible for monitoring the alcohol intake
of a potential class of offenders (heavy drinkers). Servers supervise
likely offenders and their intake of a potent crime facilitator - alcohol
(see Clarke 1997). This is important because studies have shown a relationship
between customer intoxication and incidences of violence and drunk driving
(see Stockwell 1997; Homel 1997). Servers can also play an important role
in supervising the bar area (place managers) for illegal drug deals and
other criminal activities. Table 1 summarizes key elements from the discussion
of civil remedies, routine activities, and crime discouragement.
CRITICISMS
Six concerns emerge from the preceding analysis. The first four items
relate generally to routine activities theory while the final two points
address important questions surrounding the use of civil remedies to discourage
crime.
The first criticism centers on the issue of crime displacement. This is
an enduring criticism of routine activities theory and like approaches
(Clarke 1997:28 notes that it has always been the "Achilles' heel"
of situational crime prevention). Some argue that the discouragement of
a criminal event today does nothing to reduce the likelihood that a similar
crime will be committed by the offender at another time and place. As
the argument goes, guardianship simply moves crime from one area to another
area. Clarke notes that much of the early literature on situational crime
prevention reported some levels of crime displacement (1997:28). In their
experiment on the prevention of shoplifting, Farrington et al. (1993)
found anecdotal evidence of increased pilferage in nearby stores that
did not use electronic tags. However, recent analyses have shown that
displacement costs are low (Hesseling 1994; Clarke 1997) if they exist
at all (Eck 1997). By accepting the "reasoning offender" concept,
proponents of routine activities see a way out of this theoretical thicket.
In rational choice theory, the offender has to reconsider whether alternative
courses of action, that is the commission of a comparable crime elsewhere
or at another time, is worth the risk.10
At this time, displacement is no longer a given.
Second, routine activities theory tends to ignore the research literature
that associates crime with offender characteristics (social learning,
psychological, identity, self-esteem). The latest iterations of the theory
have corrected this, in part, by moving toward a more complex and realistic
conceptualization of the likely offender (Felson 1986; Ekblom and Tilley
2000). Third, there is a heated debate within the routine activities camp
over the proper conceptualization of the theory as a micro or macro approach
to crime. Capowich (1999) argues that the multi-level research found in
Bursik and Grasmick and Sampson is more fruitful than the micro only approaches.
Fourth, Pease (1997:234) is critical of the research that has been undertaken
in the name of routine activities. He notes that most studies which test
the theory are post hoc and descriptive. At this stage in its development,
the theory is limited in its predictive capacity.
Fifth, the level of coercion that is necessary to bring about marginal
changes in crime rates is a bit troubling. The threat of civil liability
is the force that compels property owners and alcohol servers to do their
jobs. In essence, individuals are forced to take on certain policing functions
against their will. In a similar vein, curfews seem to infringe on the
rights of broad classes of citizens, irrespective of their likelihood
to commit a crime. Sixth, except in a few studies (see Mazerolle and Roehl
1998), there is little empirical evidence supporting the claim that civil
remedies, in fact, suppress crime.
CONCLUSION
This paper developed an updated version of routine activities theory and
examined its potential for explaining the impact of civil remedies on
crime discouragement. The reformulated theory was constructed by analyzing
its original propositions, linkages with other perspectives, and results
from previous empirical studies. The updated approach proved useful in
understanding how nuisance abatement, juvenile curfews, and server liability
laws impact on crime. Although the theory is rightly criticized for its
lack of empirical support in several areas, it holds much promise for
future study. The effectiveness of place managers based on some measure
of coercion is a challenging question emerging from the analysis. Are
those who are forced to become place managers better at it than those
who accept the task on a voluntary or fee-for-service basis? In the end,
the updated approach provides a promising theoretical framework for understanding
how certain civil remedies may be used to reduce crime.
NOTES
1. Commentators still lament the bias toward criminality
research: "Virtually no attention is paid to the general qualities
of criminal acts, to their connection to analogous noncriminal acts, or
to the qualities of the targets involved in them. Instead, attention focuses
almost entirely on offenders" (Gottfredson and Hirschi 1990:14).
back
2. See Hechter and Kanazawa (1997:201-203) for a detailed
summary of crime and deviance studies conducted using a rational choice
framework. back
3. Environmental criminology is itself an amalgamation
of theoretical models including routine activities, rational choice, crime
pattern, and human ecology (see Brantingham and Brantingham 1998). back
4. A thorough summary of the empirical research on
place specific crime prevention is found in Chapter 7 of the Maryland
Preventing Crime Report (Eck 1997). Researchers offered a guarded conclusion:
"Blocking crime opportunities at places can reduce crime under some
circumstances" (7-39). Several tactics appeared more promising than
others such as the use of multiple clerks in convenience stores and metal
detectors in airports. In the end, relatively weak research designs prevented
the research team from determining the effectiveness of many frequently
used interventions (e.g., closed-circuit television and lighting improvements
in public spaces and parking lots). The one place-based tactic that consistently
reduced crime was the threat of civil action against landlords for maintaining
public nuisances. This issue is addressed in greater detail later in the
paper. back
5. Ekblom and Tilley (2000:382) offer up a morally
reasoning offender whose criminal behavior is influenced by personal morality.
back
6. Felson (1995) also notes the importance of prevention
tools (e.g., mirrors to watch merchandise). back
7. A triangle figure is most often used to represent
the three primary elements in routine activity theory (see Felson 1998:53).
A variant of the triangle has been developed for use by law enforcement
agencies to identify crime problems (Schmerler et al. 1998:9). The law
enforcement "crime triangle" substitutes a "location"
element for the "absence of guardian" feature in the original
theory. Guardians are noted in the narrative accompanying the police "crime
triangle," but are not incorporated into the visualization. back
8. There has been considerable development in the
use of civil sanctions, such as business license forfeiture and health
and building code citations, by integrated community service teams that
include police, city license bureaus, and public health agencies (see,
for example, Oakland, California's SMART program described in Green 1995).
back
9. In North Carolina, the courts only recently recognized
the liability of social hosts for the acts of intoxicated guests (see
Shumate 1993 for an excellent discussion on the development of server
liability). back
10. Proponents of the routine activity approach may
also argue that crimes are not displaced easily because daily patterns
are fairly strong (e.g., people tend to take the same routes to and from
the store). To be displaced, the potential offender would need to have
other, similarly situated targets within his awareness space. back
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ABOUT THE AUTHOR
James Brunet is a doctoral candidate in the
Department of Political Science and Public Administration at North Carolina
State University. He recently directed a study of juvenile day treatment
centers for the United States Department of Justice. His dissertation
research examines the determinants of employee drug testing policies in
police departments. Direct all correspondence to James R. Brunet, Department
of Political Science and Public Administration, North Carolina State University
Campus Box 8102, Raleigh, NC 27695. Email: jim_brunet@ncsu.edu back
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